NAC-ABE Design » History » Version 6
Suravi Regmi, 11/24/2025 08:12 PM
| 1 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | # NAC-ABE Design |
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| 3 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 4 | ### What NAC-ABE Provides |
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| 5 | NAC-ABE implements name-based access control using two layers: |
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| 6 | |||
| 7 | 1. **Symmetric encryption of data** using Content Key (CK). |
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| 8 | 2. **ABE encryption of CK** using AA-issued public parameters and consumer policies. |
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| 9 | |||
| 10 | Data is encrypted with a CK, and the CK itself is encrypted under ABE so that only authorized consumers holding a matching Decryption Key (DKEY) can recover it. |
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| 11 | The Attribute Authority (AA) publishes public parameters and issues DKEYs, while NAC-ABE producers generate CKs and encrypted data using these parameters. |
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| 12 | |||
| 13 | This removes the need for any online authorization server during data fetch and enables cryptographically enforced access control at the packet level. |
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| 14 | |||
| 15 | --- |
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| 16 | ### Why mGuard Uses KP-ABE |
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| 17 | |||
| 18 | 4 | Suravi Regmi | A KP-ABE policy defines which identities can receive a Decryption Key (DKEY) and which data attributes that DKEY authorizes them to decrypt. Each policy includes: |
| 19 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 20 | 6 | Suravi Regmi | - A **policy-id** , which uniquely identifies the policy. |
| 21 | - A list of **requester-names** , representing the NDN identities that will receive the DKEY generated from this policy. |
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| 22 | - One or more **attribute-filters** , typically expressed as namespace prefixes. These prefixes determine which encrypted Content Keys (CKs) the resulting DKEY can decrypt. |
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| 23 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 24 | 4 | Suravi Regmi | Policies are evaluated using exact prefix matching. If the attribute attached by the producer during CK generation starts with a prefix listed in an allow-filter, a DKEY created from that policy will successfully decrypt the CK. |
| 25 | No role-based or device-level semantics are required; access control is driven entirely by namespace prefixes embedded within attributes. |
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| 26 | 6 | Suravi Regmi | The producer never evaluates policies and never needs access to DKEYs. All authorization takes place on the consumer side using the policy embedded in the DKEY. |
| 27 | 4 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 28 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | --- |
| 29 | 4 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 30 | ### Certificates |
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| 31 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 32 | 4 | Suravi Regmi | NAC-ABE uses two distinct certificates, each serving a different purpose in the trust and encryption pipeline. |
| 33 | #### Stream Certificate |
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| 34 | The stream certificate defines the namespace and identity under which CKs and encrypted data are published. NAC-ABE derives CK names from this certificate: |
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| 35 | |||
| 36 | ``` c |
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| 37 | /<stream-identity>/CK/<random>/ENC-BY/<attributes>/seg=i |
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| 38 | ``` |
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| 39 | Encrypted data packets are also named under the same identity prefix. This ensures that each stream's data and CKs are isolated and validated using the stream's trust chain. |
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| 40 | |||
| 41 | #### Attribute Authority (AA) Certificate |
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| 42 | |||
| 43 | The AA certificate anchors the ABE trust domain. It is used to validate: |
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| 44 | - Public Parameters (PUBPARAMS) |
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| 45 | - AA KEY packets |
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| 46 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | - Any ABE-related metadata |
| 47 | - The AA certificate ensures that only authenticated parameters are used for CK generation and that consumers can trust the DKEYs they receive. |
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| 48 | |||
| 49 | 6 | Suravi Regmi | --- |
| 50 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 51 | 6 | Suravi Regmi | ### ABE Encryption of CK (Black Box Description) |
| 52 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 53 | --- |
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| 54 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 55 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | ## 4. Certificates in NAC-ABE (Updated mGuard Behavior) |
| 56 | |||
| 57 | ### 4.1 Stream Identity Certificate |
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| 58 | The stream’s certificate is used by NAC-ABE for: |
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| 59 | |||
| 60 | **a) Naming CKs** |
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| 61 | Updated mGuard naming: |
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| 62 | 4 | Suravi Regmi | /<stream-identity>/CK/<CK-ID>/ENC-BY/<attributes>/seg=i |
| 63 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | This scopes CKs to each stream. |
| 64 | Different streams produce CKs under different prefixes. |
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| 65 | |||
| 66 | **b) Naming encrypted data** |
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| 67 | /<stream-identity>/<data-suffix> |
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| 68 | This maintains per-stream isolation. |
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| 69 | |||
| 70 | **c) Signing and trust schema validation** |
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| 71 | All CK and encrypted data packets are signed according to the stream’s identity chain. |
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| 72 | |||
| 73 | --- |
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| 74 | |||
| 75 | ### 4.2 AA Certificate |
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| 76 | The AA certificate is used as the **trusted root of ABE**. |
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| 77 | |||
| 78 | It enables the producer and consumer to: |
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| 79 | |||
| 80 | 1. Validate AA **Public Parameters (PUBPARAMS)**. |
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| 81 | 2. Validate AA **KEY** packets. |
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| 82 | 3. Determine **ABE type** from PUBPARAMS (KP-ABE vs CP-ABE). |
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| 83 | 4. Run `kpContentKeyGen()` (needs verified public params). |
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| 84 | |||
| 85 | The AA certificate defines the mathematical ABE domain; the stream certificate defines the namespace and signing authority for CK and data packets. |
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| 86 | |||
| 87 | --- |
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| 88 | |||
| 89 | ## 5. End-to-End Flow (Producer → Repo → Consumer) |
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| 90 | |||
| 91 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | --- |
| 92 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | ### Content Key (CK) |
| 93 | A CK is the symmetric key used to encrypt data. |
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| 94 | CK rotation frequency determines **how precisely access control can be enforced**. |
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| 95 | A user can only decrypt data encrypted with CKs they are authorized to received. |
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| 96 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 97 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | ### Content Key (CK) |
| 98 | A CK is the symmetric key used to encrypt data. CK rotation frequency determines access-control precision. A user can only decrypt data encrypted with CKs they are authorized for. |
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| 99 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 100 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | ### CK Granularity |
| 101 | - **Second-level:** maximum precision, very high overhead |
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| 102 | - **Minute-level:** balanced precision vs cost |
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| 103 | - **Hour-level:** minimal overhead, coarse control |
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| 104 | Granularity determines access-control precision and system cost. |
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| 105 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 106 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | ### CK vs Access-Control Granularity |
| 107 | CK granularity must be **equal to or finer than** the access-control granularity. |
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| 108 | 3 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 109 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | | Access Control ↓ / CK → | second | minute | hour | |
| 110 | |--------------------------|--------|--------|------| |
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| 111 | | second | ✔️ | ❌ | ❌ | |
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| 112 | | minute | ✔️ | ✔️ | ❌ | |
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| 113 | | hour | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | |
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| 114 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 115 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | Rule: CK rotation cannot be coarser than the authorization window. |
| 116 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 117 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | ### CK Reuse Tradeoffs |
| 118 | **High reuse (minute/hour):** fewer CK packets, low cost; coarse control. |
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| 119 | **Low reuse (second):** fine-grain control; many CKs, high overhead. |
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| 120 | 1 | Suravi Regmi | |
| 121 | 5 | Suravi Regmi | ### Implementation Note |
| 122 | Most encryption overhead is CK generation, not data encryption; finer CK granularity increases load. |
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| 126 |  |
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| 127 |  |